Abstract. We propose a framework for modelling situated resource-bounded agents. The framework is based on an objective ascription of intentional modalities and can be easily tailored to the system we want to model and the properties we wish to specify. As an elaboration of the framework, we introduce a logic, OBA, for describing the observations, beliefs, goals and actions of simple agents, and show that OBA is complete, decidable and has an efficient model checking procedure, allowing properties of agents specified in OBA to be verified using standard theorem proving or model checking techniques.
Introduction
A major goal in intelligent agent research is the formal modelling of agentenvironment systems. Such an account is key both in deepening our understanding of the notion of agency, e.g., the relationships between agent architectures, environments and behaviour, and for the principled design of agent systems. A common approach is to model the agent and its environment in some logic and prove theorems about the agent's behaviour in that logic. It is perhaps most natural to reason about the behaviour of the agent in an epistemic logic; epistemic notions such as knowledge and belief provide a compact and powerful way of reasoning about the structure and behaviour of agents (McCarthy, 1978) , and there has been a considerable amount of work in this area, for example, (Levesque, 1984; Lakemeyer, 1986; Parikh, 1987; Fagin and Halpern, 1988; Rao and Georgeff, 1991; Fagin et al., 1995; Moore, 1995; van der Hoek et al., 1999; Singh, 1999; Wooldridge and Lomuscio, 2001; van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) .
Much of this work has focused on postulating properties of agents in general, such as the relationships between beliefs, desires and intentions investigated by Rao and Georgeff (1991) . While useful, such an approach can only provide very general guidance to the agent designer, since it abstracts away from the specifics of particular agent-environment systems. However, many interesting logical properties of agents depend on the agent's architecture and program and the environment in which it is situated. In addition, from a technical point of view, existing work often makes strong assumptions which can limit its applicability when considering feasible (i.e., implementable) agent designs, e.g., the assumption that agents are logically omniscient (Hintikka, 1962) . While this is a reasonable assumption in some situations, for example where the agent is capable of only a very restricted class of inferences (Alechina and Logan, 2002) , there are many cases where the time taken to do deliberation is of critical importance. Practical agents take time to derive the consequences of their beliefs, and, in a dynamic environment, the time required by an agent to derive the consequences of its observations will determine whether such derivations can play an effective role in action selection.
In this paper, we propose a logical framework for modelling agentenvironment systems. We adopt an explicitly design-oriented view in the sense that our framework makes only minimal assumptions about agents in general, and those assumptions we do make are motivated by consideration of feasible agent designs. For example, we assume that agents will have a finite state and will require time to perform inferences. We assume the agents execute a 'sense-think-act' cycle and consider beliefs and goals of the agent at various points in the cycle; this allows us to express fine-grained properties of the agent's beliefs, such as 'after sensing, the agent's observational beliefs are always correct'.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present our modelling framework and develop a model of a simple agentenvironment system within the framework. In section 4 we introduce a new logic based on these ideas, OBA, which can be used to model a resourcebounded agent's observations, beliefs, goals and actions, and state some complexity results for OBA. In section 5 we illustrate our approach with a simple example based on the well known Tileworld domain (Pollack and Ringuette, 1990 ) and show how OBA can be used to specify properties of a Tileworld agent. In section 6 we discuss related work, and in section 7 we conclude with some ideas for future work.
The Agent-Environment Model
In this section we present a logical framework for modelling agentenvironment systems based on state transition systems. We first describe how to ascribe beliefs to agents on the basis of the contents of their state and then outline how to specify properties of agent-environment systems on the basis of transitions between states.
The state of an agent-environment system, w, consists of two parts: the environment state e(w) and the agent's state s(w). 1 The environment state is a description of the (physical or computational) environment in which the agent is situated. The agent's state contains all the internal representations which determine the behaviour of the agent. We assume that some parts of the agent's state can be interpreted as referring to (real or hypothetical) objects or events in the environment, e.g., that there is an obstacle dead ahead, or to properties of the agent itself, e.g., the level of the agent's battery. The combined agent-environment states are assumed to be finite (i.e. can be specified using finitely many variables) and we assume that there are finitely many of them.
We describe the properties of the environment in a language built from a set of propositional variables P. Beliefs ascribable to the agent come from a finite set of literals (propositional variables or their negations) L b = {(¬)p 1 , ...,(¬)p m } (where p i ∈ P). Following, for example Rosenschein and Kaelbling (1995) , we assume that the agent's state consists of finitely many 'memory locations' l 1 ,. . . ,l n , and that each location l i can contain (exactly) one of finitely many values, v i 1 , . . . , v i k . For example, we could have a location l t for the output of a temperature sensor which may take an integer value between -50 and 50. Based on those values, we can ascribe beliefs about the external world to the agent: for example, based on l t = 20 we ascribe to the agent a belief that the outside temperature is 20 C. Each φ ∈ L b corresponds to the fact that a given memory location l i (or set of memory locations) has a given a set of values, but 'translates' this into a statement about the world. We assume a mapping Bel assigning to each state s(w) of the agent a set of propositional variables and their negations which form beliefs of the agent in state s(w). Note that this 'translation' is fixed and does not depend on the truth or falsity of the formulas in the real world. In general, there is no requirement that Bel(s(w)) be consistent; if a propositional variable and its negation are associated with two different memory locations (e.g., in an agent which has two temperature sensors) then the agent may simultaneously believe that p and ¬p. Bel(s(w)) does not have to map a single value to a single belief, for example, all values of l t > 20 could be mapped to a single belief that it's "warm". Conversely, we do not assume that for every propositional variable p ∈ P, either p or ¬p belong to Bel(s(w)); if a location l i has no value (e.g., if a sensor fails) or has a value that does not correspond to any proposition, then the agent may have no beliefs about the outside world at all. Other intentional notions such as goals can be modelled analogously to beliefs, i.e., by introducing an explicit translation from the contents of the agent's state into the set of goals. We elaborate belief and goal ascription using the notion of a memory location rather than assuming that agents have an internal representation of beliefs or goals e.g., as a list of literals, for reasons of generality. The ascription mechanism described above is applicable to arbitrary agents, not only those with an explicit internal representation of beliefs and goals.
Our aim is to model the transitions of the agent-environment system as a kind of Kripke structure and express properties of the agent in some modal logic. We consider transition systems similar to the interpreted systems of Fagin et al. (1995) , except that the agent's beliefs are modelled as a local property of the agent's state. 2 . To be more precise, the structure consists of a set of agent-environment states W , each state w ∈ W has an agent part s(w) and an environment part e(w). The state of the agent s(w) comes equipped with a set of formulas Bel(s(w)) corresponding to the agent's beliefs; the state of the environment e(w) corresponds to a classical possible world, or a complete truth assignment to propositional variables in P. The agent believes that p in state w, w |= Bp, if p ∈ Bel(s(w)). Note that this truth definition for B does not give rise to any interesting logical properties of B, e.g. to KD45 axioms. This is intentional: we do not want our agents to be logically omniscient and the logical properties of agent's beliefs should be determined by the agent's architecture and program.
Within this basic set up, we can express some properties of the agent in a suitable logic, such as CTL (Clarke and Emerson, 1981) , and use a standard model checker such as SMV to check whether the properties are true of the agent-environment system. For example, we may want to check whether the agent always has true beliefs about a property p, i.e., whether AG(Bp → p). The set of states is generated by the agent's program together with appropriate environment responses. Note that the check for beliefs is done locally in state w and consists of checking whether a given formula is in the set Bel(s(w)), so the problem can be easily solved by a standard model checking techniques (e.g., with beliefs encoded as propositional variables).
However such an approach is too coarse grained even for analysing simple agents. For example, if p is a property observable by the agent and observation of p is always reliable, then the agent will have true beliefs about p immediately after it has performed an observation. However, this does not guarantee that the agent will always have true beliefs about p in every stateif the agent doesn't sense its environment continuously, it may have false beliefs about p in some states, for example, in states resulting from a change in the environment. We want to be able to express the fact that in all states resulting from the agent performing an observation, Bp is true only if p is true. The most natural way to express this is to label transitions of the system by 'moves' of the agent and the environment. We have chosen a variant of the Propositional Dynamic Logic PDL (Pratt, 1976) because it allows us to reason about labelled transition systems (another option would have been for example Multi-Modal CTL (Ågotnes et al., 2007) ).
In the remainder of this paper we work out this idea for a simple agentenvironment system in which the agent senses the environment, updates its state (in particular, selects an action to perform), and sends the chosen action to the environment, which in turn changes according to one of the possible outcomes of the action (actions are assumed to be nondeterministic).
A Simple Agent-Environment System
In what follows we view the agent and its environment as a pair of interacting automata (cf (Rosenschein and Kaelbling, 1995) ) performing a sense-thinkact cycle (see Figure 1) . At each cycle, the environment generates an input or 'percept' to the agent (updating several locations in the agent's memory), followed by the agent generating an output or 'action' to the environment. We assume that the environment "computes" its response to the agent's action instantaneously and that the agent produces its response to the input from the environment (chooses an action) in bounded time. We model perception and action as two non-deterministic transitions, obs and act. An obs transition takes the state of the environment and updates the agent's state with a percept corresponding to the information returned by the agent's sensors. We assume that perception either returns accurate information about the environment or one of finitely many outcomes of failed perception. The action transition act computes the new state of the environment given the current state of the environment and the action selected by the agent. An action either causes the environment to change in the desired way (the action succeeds), or results in one of finitely many outcomes for a failed action. If the response generated by the environment depends on both the agent's action and the amount of time it took the agent to produce it, this approximates an asynchronous interaction between the agent and a dynamic environment. Intuitively, if the agent spends too much time selecting an action, then performing it does not produce the expected result.
The agent consists of some state and an internal transition inf which models the computation the agent uses to update its state (e.g. update its beliefs and select an action to perform). inf is assumed to depend on the agent's percept at this cycle and its state from the previous cycle and to terminate in bounded time. This is a reasonable assumption for the types of agents which we consider in this paper (such as the simple Tileworld agent described in section 5).
As above, we describe the properties of the environment in a language built from a set of propositional variables P, with a finite set L b of literals which can be ascribed to the agent as beliefs and goals. In addition to the mapping Bel introduced in the previous section, we define a mapping Obs which takes the agent's state s(w) and returns a set of formulas, as a restriction of Bel to the locations holding percepts. Since observational beliefs are a subset of all beliefs, for every agent state s(w) we have Obs(s(w)) ⊆ Bel(s(w)).
Analogously we ascribe a set of goals Goal(s(w)) to the agent based on a designer-specified translation of the agent's state. The cycle of the combined agent-environment automaton consists of the three transitions: obs, inf and act (see Figure 2 ). At each cycle the environment updates the agent's state s(w) with its percept for this cycle. The agent then derives the consequences of its new beliefs (if any) and performs an action on the basis of this new state. The agent's observational beliefs, Obs(s(w)), only change after the obs transition and the rest of the agent's beliefs and goals only change after the inf transition. We assume that inf does not change the agent's observational beliefs Obs(s(w)), as these correspond to the agent's 'sensor readings', and, as such, should not be overwritten by inference. 3 We further assume that the environment only changes in response to the agent's action.
Introducing three separate transitions rather than collapsing them into one single step (corresponding to a full obs, inf and act cycle) allows more precise modelling of changes in the agent's beliefs and goals. We want to be able to talk about the state of the agent after it has performed the observation but before it completed all the planning necessary to choose an action, or after it has performed an action but before it has sensed its effects. This is essential in analysing a resource-bounded agent which may be capable of selecting the "right" action to perform but is unable to do so before the environment changes so as to invalidate the action's preconditions.
A Logic for Agent-Environment Systems
In this section, we give a formal definition of the transition graphs of the agent-environment system described in the previous section, and a logical language to reason about the agent's observations, beliefs and goals.
We describe transition graphs in a logic which we call OBA (for 'Observation, Belief and Action'). OBA includes PDL (Propositional Dynamic Logic, see (Pratt, 1976) ) with three atomic transition labels o, i and a corresponding to obs, inf and act, and in addition contains observation, belief and goal operators. We define a transition term x as o | i | a | x; y |x * , where if x and y are transition terms then x; y is their sequential composition (transition x followed by y) and x * stands for 0 or finitely many iterations of x. (We could have added other constructs such as non-deterministic choice ∪ but we do not need them for axiomatising the logic below.)
In addition to the set of propositional variables P, a set of literals L b which are ascribable to the agent as beliefs and goals, and boolean connectives, the language of OBA contains:
− for each transition term x, a unary modality x . x φ, where φ is any formula, stands for 'from here we can make an x transition after which φ holds'. A dual modality [x]φ is defined as ¬ x ¬φ and stands for 'after all x transitions we can make from here, φ holds'.
− unary modalities O, I and G, which can only be applied to elements of L b . Oφ stands for 'the agent observes that φ', Iφ stands for 'the agent has a non-observational belief φ', and Gφ stands for 'the agent has a goal that φ', φ ∈ L b .
The belief modality B is defined as follows: Bφ = df Oφ ∨ Iφ.
In the models below we only allow legal states of the system as possible worlds, i.e., states which are possible given the characteristics of environment and the agent's program. We assume that beliefs are assigned to states as described in section 2
W is a set of worlds. Each world w is a pair (s(w), e(w)) where s(w) is the state of the agent and e(w) the state of the environment.
Obs(s(w)) ⊆ L b is a finite set of observational beliefs associated with s(w),

−Obs(s(w)) ⊆ L b is a finite set of non-observational beliefs associated with s(w); Bel(s(w)), the set of agent's beliefs at s(w), is Obs(s(w)) ∪ −Obs(s(w)).
Goal(s(w)) ⊆ L b is a finite set of goals associated with s(w);
V assigns true or false to pairs (e(w), p) where e(w) is a state of the environment and p ∈ P.
obs, inf , act are binary relations on W . To say that a world v is reachable from a world w by an atomic transition x (e.g., obs) we will use the notation w Before we give the truth definition for OBA, we define the relations R x corresponding to transition terms x inductively as follows:
The relation of a formula φ being true at a world w in M , M, w |= OBA φ (or, for simplicity when no confusion can arise M, w |= φ) is defined as follows: M, w |= x * ψ iff there exists a world w ′ such that R x * (w, w ′ ) and M, w ′ |= ψ.
M, w |= Oψ iff ψ ∈ Obs(s(w)); M, w |= Iψ iff ψ ∈ −Obs(s(w));
M, w |= Gψ iff ψ ∈ Goal(s(w));
4 We could have added a condition that the outcome of an action depends only on the state of the environment (and not on the state of the agent) but in the current setting something like 'if e(w) = e(w ′ ) then {v : 
Normal modal logic axioms for [x] , where x is any transition Note that there are no axioms connecting beliefs and goals, in particular no requirement that the agent does not intend what it already believes (cf Rao and Georgeff (1991) ). We will see in the next section that it is possible for a resource bounded agent to both believe and have a goal that φ, e.g., while it is updating its goals. Proof. To prove soundness, we need to show that all axioms are valid and rules preserve validity. The argument for standard axioms and rules such as CL, MP, K, N, C, It1, It2 is omitted. The axiom T1 is valid because from every state w, exactly one of the three transitions is possible. The axiom T2 is valid because if it is possible to make an x transition from w then from the resulting state it is possible to make a y transition, provided (x, y) ∈ {(o, i), (i, a), (a, o)}. Validity of C(obs) follows from Change(obs). We can show by induction on subformulas χ of φ built from propositional variables and subformulas of the form Iψ and Gψ that M, w |= χ iff M, w ′ |= χ where w ′ is accessible from w by obs. Analogously for C(inf ) and C(act). Now we prove completeness. Let φ be an OBA-consistent formula. We will construct a finite satisfying model for φ in a standard way (see, for example, Blackburn et al. (2001) ). Let Cl(φ) be the Fisher-Ladner closure of the set of subformulas of φ together with three formulas o ⊤, i ⊤ and a ⊤. The satisfying model for φ, M φ , is defined as follows:
Axioms for composition and iterations
C [x; y]φ ↔ [x][y]φ It1 x * φ ↔ (φ ∨ x x * φ) It2 [x * ](φ → [x]φ) → (φ → [x * ]φ)
Availability and order of transitions
T1 ( o ⊤ ∧ ¬ i ⊤ ∧ ¬ a ⊤) ∨ ( i ⊤ ∧ ¬ o ⊤ ∧ ¬ a ⊤) ∨ ( a ⊤ ∧ ¬ i ⊤ ∧ ¬ o ⊤) T2 [o] i ⊤ ∧ [i] a ⊤ ∧ [a] o ⊤
Changes after transitions
The set of worlds W φ is the set of all maximal consistent subsets of Cl(φ) V φ (e(w), p) = true iff p ∈ w Obs φ (s(w)) = {ψ : Oψ ∈ w} −Obs φ (s(w)) = {ψ : Iψ ∈ w} Goal φ (s(w)) = {ψ : Gψ ∈ w} w obs −→ v in M φ iff the conjunction of formulas in w, which we denote byŵ, is consistent with o v, similarly for inf and act.
For every regular expression π composed from obs, inf and act using sequential composition and finite iteration, we define the corresponding accessibility relation as S π (w, v) iff the formulaŵ ∧ π v is OBA-consistent. The proof that relations defined this way do indeed correspond to sequential composition and finite iteration, as well as the existence lemma and the truth lemma, are standard. Note that the restriction on the language ensures that Bel φ (s(w)) and Goal φ (s(w)) only contain propositional variables and their negations. We need to show that the special conditions on the OBA models hold: namely, that the transitions follow each other in the right way, and change the world in the way constrained by Availability, Order, Change(obs), Change(inf ) and Change(act).
Let us first show that in each world, exactly one of the transitions obs, inf , act is possible. Note that the conjunction of formulas in each world is consistent with exactly one of o ⊤, i ⊤ and a ⊤ (because the world is maximally consistent with respect to T1 and contains some x ⊤). This means thatŵ ∧ x ⊤ for some x is consistent, and ⊤ can be expanded into a maximally consistent conjunction of formulasv from Cl(φ) by forcing choices; this gives us a world v accessible by x from w. For all other atomic transitions y, there is no such world v, because ifŵ ∧ y v is consistent, then so isŵ ∧ y ⊤, but w is inconsistent with T1.
Next, let us show that the Order property holds. As an example, we show that obs cannot be followed by act: proofs for the other conditions are similar. Suppose someŵ is consistent with o v andv is consistent with a û. Note that in this casev contains a ⊤. So it follows that o a ⊤ is consistent, but this contradicts T2.
To prove that Change(obs) holds, we need to show that wheneverŵ∧ o v is consistent, the state of the environment is the same in w and v, that is for every propositional variable p, p ∈ w iff p ∈ v. Suppose p ∈ w but p ∈ v. Then it follows that p ∧ o ¬p is consistent, but it contradicts C(obs). Similarly for the case p ∈ w but p ∈ v. Non-observational beliefs are the same in w and v, that is −Obs φ (s(w)) = −Obs φ (s(v)): this follows from Iψ ∈ w iff Iψ ∈ v, by C(obs). Similarly for the set of goals in w and v.
The case of Change(inf ) is analogous. Finally, Change(act ) holds if Obs φ (s(w)), −Obs φ (s(w)) and Goal(s(w)) do not change as a result of an act transition. In other words, ifŵ ∧ a v is consistent, then Xφ ∈ w iff Xφ ∈ v, where X ∈ {O, I, G}. But this is exactly what the axiom C(act) guarantees. Note that the form of the axiom is as it is because act may change the truth value of arbitrary formulas, including non-modal formulas, but cannot change the agent's beliefs and goals. 2 THEOREM 2. The satisfiability problem for OBA is decidable.
Proof. Decidability follows from the bounded model property for OBA which can be established as a by-product of Theorem 1: every satisfiable formula φ has a model of size at most 2 |φ| . This gives the following NEXPTIME decision procedure: guess a model of size 2 |φ| and check whether φ is true there. 2 In fact, the complexity of the decision procedure can be improved to EXPTIME analogously to PDL (see Blackburn et al. (2001) ). Proof. This follows from the result on complexity for model checking for PDL (Emerson and Lei, 1986) . In addition to PDL modalities we have modal operators O, I and G in the language, but checking whether Oψ, Iψ or Gψ is true in a world w can be done in constant time; subformulas of the form Oψ, Iψ and Gψ can be treated as propositional variables.
2
In OBA, we can express properties of a particular agent design and verify whether they hold as expected. There are two possible ways of doing this. We can axiomatise the agent's program and the interaction between the agent and its environment, and prove that the property follows from those extra axioms and the OBA axioms. Alternatively, given the agent's program and all possible responses to the agent's actions by the environment, we can generate the state transition graph and check whether the property is true in all states in the graph. Both approaches are feasible given the decidability and low cost of model checking of OBA.
In this paper, we are concerned with axiomatising phases in the agent's execution cycle rather than properties of a particular inference mechanism or of the agent's actions. This limitation can easily be relaxed. Namely, we can consider agents capable of performing a finite set of actions a 1 , . . . , a n , and define an action transition a as a 1 ∪ . . . ∪ a n (union of basic actions). In addition to the general conditions on the models above, we would add pre-and postconditions of all the basic actions, and the corresponding axioms to the logic. Similarly, we could add more conditions on the inference mechanism of the agent in the semantics and add corresponding axioms. For example, if an agent's program has a rule 'if p is in the set of beliefs, then adopt a goal q' then the semantic condition on inf would include a corresponding condition on assignments before and after inf and the logic will have an axiom Bp → i Gq.
An example: the Tileworld
In this section we illustrate our approach with an example based on the wellknown Tileworld domain (Pollack and Ringuette, 1990) . The Tileworld is a testbed for the evaluation of agent architectures, and has been used to investigate agent commitment strategies (when an agent should abandon its current goal and replan) (Pollack et al., 1994) and in comparisons of reactive and deliberative agent architectures (Pollack and Ringuette, 1990) . The Tileworld environment consists of a rectangular grid. Each square contains either a 'tile' or a 'hole' or is empty (i.e., contains neither a tile or a hole). The goal of a Tileworld agent is to fill the holes in the grid with tiles. In the original Tileworld, tiles and holes appear and disappear at random, and the agent's success is measured by the number of holes it is able to fill with tiles in a given amount of (real or simulated) time. For reasons of brevity, our Tileworld is very simple. The environment consists of an unbounded strip of grid squares. Each grid square contains either a tile or a hole or is empty, and tiles and holes are distributed randomly along the strip of grid squares. 5 The environment contains a single agent which can move forward on rails laid over the squares and has a sensor which allows it to see whether the square directly underneath it contains a tile or a hole or is empty. If it sees a tile it can pick it up and carry it. If it is holding a tile and is located above a hole it can drop it in the hole. Holes are one tile deep and dropping a tile into a hole 'fills it in', turning the hole into an empty square. For simplicity we have assumed that the agent's sensors are veridical in the sense that they either return correct information about the environment or an 'undefined' value indicating the sensor returned no data at this cycle. We also assume that the actions of picking up or dropping a tile can fail, leaving the world unchanged; moving forward always succeeds and leaves the agent above the next square. We stress that these assumptions are not essential, and OBA can be used to reason about more complex environments and more realistic agents with unreliable perception and more complex actions failures.
The goal of the Tileworld agent is put a tile in a hole. Informally, the program of the agent consists of the following simple rules:
− if holding a tile and above a hole, repeatedly try to drop the tile until the tile is in the hole;
− if not holding a tile and above a tile, repeatedly try to pick it up until the square below the agent is empty;
− otherwise, move forward.
The agent's state consists of four memory locations, p, g, h, and a:
p is for storing percepts, and can take one of four values: 0 for the agent is above a tile, 1 for the agent is above a hole, 2 for the agent is above an empty square and 3 for 'undefined'.
h is for storing information about whether the agent is holding a tile: 1 for the agent is holding a tile, and 0 for the agent is not holding a tile. For the sake of the example, we assume that there is no sensor which can determine whether an agent is holding a tile, but instead this information has to be inferred by the agent.
g is for storing goals, and can take one of four values: 0 for looking for a tile, 1 for picking up a tile, 2 for looking for a hole, and 3 for dropping a tile.
a is for storing selected actions, and can also take one of four values: 0 for pick up the tile beneath the agent, 1 for drop the tile the agent is holding, 2 for move forward one grid cell, and 3 for a special 'no-op' action which does not change the environment.
The execution cycle of the agent then becomes:
obs : sensing the environment to find out what is underneath the agent and updating the p location;
inf : updating the values of h, g and a according to the agent's program; and act : sending the value in a to the environment.
To ascribe beliefs and goals to the Tileworld agent, we do not need a distinct propositional variable for every combination of location and value. The set P T L = {p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , h, a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } is sufficient to capture those beliefs and goals which are relevant to the choice of the agent's actions. To simplify fully automated belief ascription, we could use a propositional variable for every combination of location and value.
For the sake of brevity, we do not specify Obs, Bel and Goal completely, but illustrate them via examples. Let p 0 mean 'the agent is above a tile'. p 0 ∈ Obs(s(w)) iff in s(w), p = 0 (the agent observes that it is above a tile); similarly for p 1 and p 2 .
¬p 0 ∈ Obs(s(w)) iff in s(w), p = 1 or p = 2 (the agent observes that it is not above a tile); similarly for ¬p 1 and ¬p 2 .
p 0 ∈ Goal(s(w)) iff in s(w), g = 0 (the agent has a goal to be above a tile); similarly for p 1 and g = 2.
Note that it is possible for example for neither p 0 nor ¬p 0 to be in Obs(s(w)) if the agent's sensors return no data at this cycle (p = 3). The agent's program is given by the following rules:
where a = {1, 3} means the agent is in a state in which the value of location a is either 1 or 3. The first seven rules cover the cases in which the agent holding a tile and is either searching for a hole to put it in, or has found a hole and is trying to drop the tile. Rules 8-14 cover the cases in which the agent is not holding a tile and is either searching for a tile, or trying to pick up a tile it has found. Rule 1 initiates a drop action when the agent is above a hole and holding a tile, rule 2 notices that the drop was successful and starts the agent looking for a new tile (rule 12), and rule 3 repeats the drop action if it was unsuccessful. Rules 4 and 5 cause the agent to continue searching (move forward) if it is holding a tile and not above a hole. Rules 8-12 are similar but handle the case where the agent is trying to pick up a tile. Rules 6 and 7 handle perception failures when the agent is looking for a hole and dropping a tile respectively, and rules 13 and 14 handle perception failures while looking for and picking up a tile. If the agent's sensors return no data at this cycle (indicated by a value of 3 in location p), the agent's beliefs and goals don't change and it selects no-op action, in the hope that sensing at the next cycle will return an informative value for p.
OBA can be used to specify properties of the Tileworld agent that a designer may want to verify. For example, we can state that the agent will achieve a particular goal, e.g., finding a tile: Gp 0 → (a; o; i) * p 0 ('if the agent has a goal to be above a tile then after finitely many cycles it will be above a tile'). This statement holds in all states provided the sensors are veridical, sensor failures only last for finitely many cycles and it is always possible to reach a tile after finitely many moves forward. The veridicality of sensors can be expressed as [o](Oφ → φ) (note that Oφ → φ is only guaranteed to hold after an obs transition). 6 Another important property is commitment to goals: if the agent has a goal φ, it will not give it up until φ becomes true: Gφ → [a; o; i](φ ∨ Gφ). As we mentioned in the previous section, it is possible for the agent both to believe and intend the same formula: for example, if the agent's goal is to be above a tile and it has performed a move forward action which brought it above a tile, then after a successful obs transition it will believe that it is above a tile (Op 0 hence Bp 0 ), but will still have the goal of being above the tile (the goals will be updated after the inf transition); hence Bφ → ¬Gφ is not valid.
Related Work
Our approach has some similarities with the situated automata work of Rosenschein and Kaelbling (1995) . Rosenschein and Kaelbling model an agent using two functions, a state update function, f , which maps the input (percepts) and the value of the agent's internal state at the last cycle into a new value of the internal state, and an output function, g, that maps the input and the value of the agent's internal state at the last cycle into the output (actions). They ascribe belief (or rather knowledge) to the agent by associating with every combination of location/value pair (l,v) the most informative proposition φ such that in all runs of the system when l = v in the agent's state, φ holds. This forces the agent to have true beliefs and its beliefs are closed under logical consequence. The resulting notion corresponds to implicit knowledge as defined by Fagin et al. (1995) , and satisfies the properties of an S5 modality. van der Hoek, Linder and Meyer (1999) formalise all relevant aspects of the agent's architecture and use PDL to reason about state transitions as we do. However they model agents as logically omniscient, consider only deterministic actions, and model knowledge and beliefs using an additional Kripke structure associated with every global state. In contrast, our approach combines the modelling of belief change and action performance in a single structure and is much simpler, giving a more efficient model-checking procedure.
A compact modular representation of agent-environment systems has been recently proposed by Jamroga andÅgotnes (2007); we believe our logic can be interpreted on such systems rather than on combined transition graphs.
Other related work on epistemic logic for agents includes, for example, Moore (1995) , Singh (1999) , Wooldridge and Lomuscio (2001) and recent work on dynamic epistemic logic (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007) . However, as in (van der Hoek et al., 1999) they consider deterministic actions and a more traditional definition of knowledge using possible worlds semantics.
Our work has more similarities with the approach of Konolige (Konolige, 1986) where beliefs are modelled as formulas, rather than as sets of possible worlds (propositions), and are not automatically closed under logical consequence. Other syntactic approaches to epistemic logic (syntactic belief and modelling steps of inference) include Step Logic (Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis, 1990) .
Step Logic provides a mechanism for reasoning about non-omniscient time-bounded reasoners; an agent's beliefs are indexed by time points or steps corresponding to stages in the agent's reasoning. Other recent approaches that avoid the problem of logical omniscience and model an agent's beliefs as syntactic objects are Duc's dynamic epistemic logic (Duc, 1995; Duc, 1997 ), Sierra's et al.'s (1996) work on logics for reflective architectures, andÅgotnes's logic of finite syntactic epistemic states (Ågotnes, 2004) and (Ågotnes and Alechina, 2007) . The approach presented in this paper concentrates on the interaction of a resource-bounded agent with its environment, rather than on stepwise modelling of its inference process.
In other work, we have applied a syntactic approach to modelling agent's beliefs to verifying properties of an agent implemented in a simplified version of the 3APL agent programming language . However, in that work we made a simplifying assumption that the agent's beliefs are veridical and actions successful, to avoid explicitly modelling the agent's environment. The current paper provides a way to overcome this limitation.
Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a new approach to the formal modelling of agentenvironment systems which focuses on particular agent designs. Properties of the agent-environment system depend on the agent's architecture and program and the characteristics of its environment rather than on a priori assumptions about agents in general, e.g., that agents are rational or logically omniscient. We show how to ascribe beliefs and other intentional modalities based on designer-stipulated correlations between the values of locations in the state of the agent and the state of the environment, and how to model operations within the agent and interactions between agent and environment as state transitions. Our approach to belief ascription is local in the sense that belief is not defined in terms of all possible runs of the agent-environment system (cf Fagin et al. (1995) ) and the set of transitions can be tailored to the system we want to model and the properties we wish to specify. For example, to model the agent's deliberation more precisely, we can introduce a finer grain in the agent's state update transition.
Drawing on these ideas, we define a new logic, OBA, which can be used to model a resource bounded agent's observation, beliefs, goals and actions. We prove completeness and decidability results for OBA and show that it has a reasonable model checking procedure (O(|M | × |φ|), where |M | is the size of the model and |φ| the size of the formula). OBA allows for both failed perception and failed actions, and the agent's beliefs are not required to be consistent or closed under logical consequence. We explicitly introduce the cycle of the agent in the logic and analyse the agent's beliefs at each point in the cycle, allowing us to distinguish the agent's beliefs, e.g., after a percept is received but before the rest of the state is updated. As an illustration, we model a simple Tileworld agent and express some properties of the resulting agent-environment system in OBA. Such properties can be efficiently checked using standard model checking or theorem proving techniques.
In future work we plan to develop the framework outlined above to analyse more complicated agent behaviours, for example, to model trial and error attempts to achieve a goal, or characterise robust behaviours.
